The Oklahoma Marketable Record Title Act Introduction by Hicks, John F.
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 9 Issue 1 
Spring 1973 
The Oklahoma Marketable Record Title Act Introduction 
John F. Hicks 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
John F. Hicks, The Oklahoma Marketable Record Title Act Introduction, 9 Tulsa L. J. 68 (2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol9/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please 
contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu. 
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
THE OKLAHOMA MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACT
INTRODUCTION
By JomH F. HICKS*
This article is based upon speeches delivered in 1972 to
the Tulsa Title and Probate Lawyers Association and the Real
Property Section of the Oklahoma Bar Association. The in-
terest of attorneys across Oklahoma in the Oklahoma Market-
able Record Title Act' was evidenced by the comments and
questions raised during these speeches. Although the Act has
been in effect for almost ten years, there is no judicial con-
struction of it as yet and relatively little non-judicial inter-
pretation of it. 2 The purpose of this article is to help fill in
this gap by discussing the basic features of the Act and ex-
amining some of the complexities surrounding it.
BACKGROUND OF MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE
LEGISLATION
Problems in the American Conveyancing System in the
Absence of Marketable Title Legislation
Practitioners in the conveyancing field are well aware of
many of the problems in this field that have given rise to the
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Tulsa, College of
Law.
' OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, §§ 71-80 (1971), amending OKLA. STAT.
tit. 16, §§ 71-81 (Supp. 1963).
2 See Blair, Marketable Title: Should It Be Defined by
Statute in Oklahoma?, 29 OKLA. B. Ass'N J. 1853 (1958);
Pray, Title Standards and the Marketable Title Act, 38 OKLA.
B. Ass'N J. 611 (1967); Simes, The Improvement of Convey-
ancing: Recent Developments, 34 OKLA. B. Ass'x J. 2357
(1963); Comment, Estates In Land: Effect of Unconstitution-
ality of Similar Legislation on Oklahoma's Marketable Rec-
ord Title Act, 20 OKLA. L. REV. 442 (1967).
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need for marketable record title legislation.3 First, the mere
passage of time is causing chains of title to grow ever longer.
Increased business activity, population mobility, home owner-
ship, mortgage financing, the population growth and the shift
from rural to urban land patterns have increased the volume
of title activity that puts a strain on the present recording
system and conveyancing practice. These factors, which make
title examination more time consuming and complex, present
the examiner with the dilemma of charging a fee that is too
expensive for the average client or too low to justify the
time spent.
Added to this problem is the inefficiency and expense of
examining the title all the way back to its source each time
an examination is required. This problem is particularly acute
in older states with long title histories and has often led to
the custom of tracing titles back for a stated number of years
and until a warranty deed is encountered.4 Of course, this cus-
tom is without legal justification and exposes both the pur-
chaser and his examiner to potential loss.
A second problem involves future interests that make the
duration of present estates uncertain. From a practical stand-
point the only property interests that are generally marketable
are fees simple absolute, leases for years and fees simple sub-
ject to such leases. When a present interest is subject to a
future interest which is to take effect at an uncertain time,
neither interest is marketable because of the uncertainty in-
volved. This is especially true of possibilities of reverter and
rights of re-entry for condition broken.
8 See P. BASYE, CLEARiNG LAmN TITLES 3, 5, 60-61, 368 (2d ed.
1970); L. SnwEs, A HANDBOOK FOR MoRE EFFIciwT CoNEY-
ANciNG 32-36 (1961); Barnett, Marketable Title Acts -
Panacea or Pandemonium?, 53 CORNELL L.Q. 45 (1967);
Basye, Trends and Progress - The Marketable Title Acts,
47 IowA L. REv. 261 (1962).
4 In Massachusetts and Connecticut tracing title back sixty
years is customary. In other states periods of forty-five or
fifty years are customary. P. BASYE, supra note 3, at 12-13.
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A third problem relates to facts extrinsic to the record
which may affect title but which cannot be ascertained from
examination of the records. Such facts as forged deeds and
the acquisition of title by adverse possession fall into this cate-
gory. What has been needed is a legislative device to reduce
the number of extrinsic facts which must be considered by a
title examiner. Marketable record title legislation satisfies this
need.
Fourth, although statutes of limitation and various cura-
tive acts 6 are helpful, they are not alone sufficient to cure a
title of defects and stale claims and promote efficient title ex-
amination and marketability. The Oklahoma statute of limita-
tions, as is true generally, applies only when the technical re-
quirements for adverse possession have been met; affects only
present interests and leaves unaffected future interests; in-
cludes tolling provisions for present interest owners under dis-
ability, and results in a title that is not marketable without
judicial action. The Oklahoma curative acts do not define or
declare what constitutes a marketable title. They take the
negative approach of declaring what will not be a defect or
claim against title, but do not attempt an affirmative defini-
tion of what constitutes marketable title, as does marketable
record title legislation.
And, fifth, in the absence of marketable record title legis-
lation, the present system has made no provision for official
verification of the validity or effect of any title transaction.
Therefore, a purchaser must hire "experts" such as abstractors
to compile the record of the title under investigation and at-
torneys or title insurance companies to examine the record
and draw conclusions concerning the status of the title. The
conclusions are inevitably very conservative because legal
standards for titles are not susceptible to mathematical meas-
urement or precision and the examiner must, in part, base his
5 OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 93; tit. 60, § 333 (1971).
6 OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, §§ 4, 27(a), 39(a), 51, 61-66 (1971).
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conclusions on what conclusions a later examiner of the same
title may draw. This process leads to overabundant caution
that can degenerate into the "fly-specking" which most ex-
aminers deplore but which many follow.
History of Marketable Record Title Legislation
Throughout the twentieth century there have been at-
tempts to solve the problems inherent in the American con-
veyancing system. One of the most successful approaches has
been through marketable record title legislation. In 1919, Iowa
adopted a rudimentary marketable record title act that bar-
red all actions based upon any claim arising or existing prior
to January 1, 1900, unless notice of the claim was filed before
July 4, 1920.7 The date of the bar or recording requirement
has been advanced periodically. The innovation of the act is
that it went beyond the conventional statutes of limitation in
applying to claims that were not presently actionable, to fu-
ture interests as well as present interests, to contingent inter-
ests as well as vested interests, and to persons under disabili-
ties as well as those of full capacity. The act was comprehen-
sive in its approach to eliminating defects and stale claims in
a title.
In 1945, Michigan adopted a prototype of the current
Model Marketable Record Title Act.8 Its features are similar
to the Model Act, upon which the Oklahoma Act is based.
Lewis Simes and Clarence Taylor of the University of Michi-
gan Law School used the Michigan Act as the basis for a joint
project with the Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust
Law of the American Bar Association and the University of
Michigan Law School, which resulted in the publication of
the Model Marketable Record Title Act.9 The Model Act pro-
7 IOWA CODE ANN. § 614.17 (Supp. 1972).
8 MIcH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 565.101 (1967).
0 L. SnvzEs & C. TAYLOR, THE IMPRovmm OF CONVEYANCING
By LEGISLATION 6-20 (1960). Other products of the project
are a set of Model Title Standards and a Handbook sur-
veying the problems in American conveyancing practice
and discussing proposed solutions.
19731
4
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 9 [1973], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol9/iss1/3
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
vides that outstanding interests and defects that are not found
within the recent history of the chain of title in question are
extinguished as a matter of law. The Model Act is compre-
hensive in its approach to eliminating stale claims and defects
in a title in the same way as is the Iowa Act discussed earlier.
A total of fifteen states have now adopted some type of mark-
etable record title legislation.' 0 Some of the acts are similar
to the original Iowa Act in that they impliedly extinguish old
outstanding interests and defects by barring any remedial ac-
tion on the claims. A majority of states adopting this type of
legislation have used the framework found in the Model Act
which expressly extinguishes certain outstanding interests and
defects. The Oklahoma Act, adopted in 1963 and amended in
1970, is substantially similar to the Model Act.
Objectives of Marketable Record Title Legislation
Although there are variations in the acts found in the fif-
teen states that have adopted some type of marketable record
title legislation, there are three objectives" that are basic to
all of these acts, including Oklahoma's.
The first objective is to simplify land title transactions
10 Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Min-
nesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South
Dakota, Utah, Vermont and Wisconsin; see Co=N. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 47-33 (b) to 33(1) (Supp. 1973); FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 712.01-.10 (1969); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, §§ 12.1-.4
(Smith-Hurd 1966); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 56-1101 to -1110
(Supp. 1972); IowA CODE ANN. § § 614.17-.20, .29-.38 (1950),
as amended, (Supp. 1972); MhcH. CoMP. LAWS Aim. §§
565.101-.109 (1967); MnqN. STAT. ANN. § 541.023 (Supp. 1973);
NE. REv. STAT. §§ 76-288 to -298 (1971); N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 47-19A-01 to -11 (1960); OHio REv. CODE Am. §§ 5301.47-
.56 (Baldwin 1971); OiLA. STAT. tit. 16, §§ 71-80 (1971);
S.D. Com. LAWS §§ 43-30-1 to -15 (1967); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ § 57-9-1 to -10 (1963), as amended, (Supp. 1971); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 27, §§ 601-606 (Supp. 1972); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 893.15 (1966).
11 L. SimEs & C. TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 297-306.
[Vol. 9, No. I
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by reducing the period of title search and the period of title
examination. Strictly speaking, marketable record title acts
do not limit search and examination more than that which
would be otherwise conducted because of, for example, the
exceptions1 2 included in the acts. But the acts can promote
and standardize conventional limitations on search and exami-
nation 13 and can obviate the necessity of searching or examin-
ing instruments creating interests which are barred by the
acts. The acts, then, eliminate the risk involved in customary
limitations on search or examination that may be followed in
a particular area.14
The second objective of this legislation is to comprehen-
sively clear land titles by clearing that portion of a chain of
title antedating the period prescribed by the legislation. In
this objective the acts go beyond conventional statutes of limi-
tation and curative acts and apply to all defects or interests
affecting title except for those specifically exempted from
operation of the respective acts. In addition, marketable record
title legislation makes the legal effect of the clearance ap-
parent from the record rather than from facts extrinsic to the
record.
The third objective is to give a positive, usable definition
to the concept of "marketability." The problem in this area is
that there has been no precise meaning, no accepted frame
of reference for the term "marketability." Marketable record
title legislation has given a positive definition to the term
"marketable title" and has defined the consequences flowing
from such definition so as to make the determination of mark-
etability of a given title reasonably simple and within a re-
stricted period of record search and title examination.
It should be pointed out here that "marketable record
12 See p. 92 infra.
18 Oklahoma Title Examination Standard 19.13 states what
must be included in an abstract under the Oklahoma Mar-
ketable Record Title Act.
14 See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
19731
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title" as defined by the acts is not necessarily a commercially
marketable title; it is not necessarily a title which a vendor
under a contract of sale could force on the vendee in an ac-
tion for specific performance of the contract. This distinction
exists because of two inherent limitations in all marketable
record title legislation: (1) the acts cleanse a title only of pre-
root-of-title interests and defects and do not clear the title
of post-root-of-title interests and defects; and (2) the acts pro-
vide for certain exceptions to their operation.
Basic Operation of the Oklahoma Marketable Record Title Act
There are two basic features to the operation of the Ok-
lahoma Act. The first feature deals with the definition of a
"marketable record title." Section 71 provides that if one hav-
ing the legal capacity to own land has an unbroken chain of
record title of at least thirty years duration, with no defects
in that record chain of title and no recorded instruments dur-
ing that period which purport to divest the title, then that
person has a marketable record title. Several aspects of this
Section should be stressed. The unbroken chain of record title
may consist of either a single conveyance or other title trans-
action which purports to create an interest and which has
been a matter of public record for at least thirty years, or a
connected series of conveyances or other title transactions of
public record in which the root of title has been a matter of
public record for at least thirty years.15 But, in either situ-
ation, the chain of title must be of record; unrecorded links
in the chain of title prevent the title from being a marketable
record title. In addition, there must be nothing appearing of
record within the basic thirty-year period purporting to divest
the marketable record title claimant of his interest. Okla-
homa Title Examination Standard 19.4 states that matters
"purporting to divest" within the meaning of this Section are
those matters appearing of record which, if taken at face
1r See OILA. STAT. tit. 16, ch. 1, app. (1971) Oklahoma Title
Examination Standard 19.3.
[Vol. 9, No. 1
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value, warrant the inference that the interest has been di-
vested.
The second feature deals with the effect on certain in-
terests of a title being defined as marketable. Section 73 pro-
vides that all interests created prior to the first title trans-
action, called the "root of title," recorded at the beginning
of the basic thirty-year period are extinguished as a matter
of law. The effect of this Section is to make the status of a
given title dependent on a recent period of its history rather
than on its entire history. This allows title search and title
examination to likewise be confined primarily to the same re-
cent period of the given title's history. The word "primarily"
is used because the Act includes certain limitations and ex-
ceptions to its operation which force title search and title ex-
amination back beyond the basic thirty-year period.16
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE OKLAHOMA ACT
Questions have been raised periodically concerning the
constitutionality of marketable record title legislation. 17 Two
principal arguments have been made against its constitu-
tionality. One argument is that such legislation is retroactive
in character in that it affects existing or vested property in-
terests rather than merely affecting property interests to be
created in the future. There is no provision of the United
States Constitution prohibiting the enactment of retroactive
legislation, as such, other than the prohibition against ex post
facto laws, and this is held to apply only to criminal laws.18
However, this argument against the retroactive application of
marketable record title legislation to vested property interests
can be linked to the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment
10 See p. 92 infra.
17 See L. SniEs & C. TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 253-92; Aigler,
Constitutionality of Marketable Title Acts, 50 MIcH. L. REV.
185 (1951); Aigler, A Supplement to Constitutionality of
Marketable Title Acts, 56 MIcH. L. REV. 225 (1957).
18 Calder v. Bull, 1 U.S. (3 Dall.) 269 (1798).
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to the United States Constitution against depriving a person
of property without due process of law.19 These comments
apply to the Oklahoma Constitution as well.20 The second
argument generally raised relates to Section 10 of Article I
of the United States Constitution which prohibits the impair-
ment of the obligation of contracts. The Oklahoma Constitu-
tion has a similar provision.21 These two arguments are dis-
cussed together in the following paragraphs since common
principles relate to their applicability to marketable record
title legislation such as the Oklahoma Act.
These sections of the United States Constitution do not
guarantee absolute protection against interference with prop-
erty rights or contract rights by a state. Both are subject to
the reasonable exercise of a state's police power in protecting
the public health, safety, morals or welfare.2 2 Two tests are
applied in determining whether or not the legislation is a
valid exercise of the state's police power.2 3 The first test in-
volves the question of whether or not the legislation has a
valid objective. Marketable record title legislation can be con-
sidered valid because it promotes the public welfare, which
is a well established objective of a state's police power. There
is a great similarity here between marketable record title
legislation and recording acts which, though operating to de-
stroy property interests, have been upheld because they en-
able the public to rely on record ownership24 and because
they promote the free alienability of land,25 which is a major
goal of modern property law. Now that the public record is
19 See J. ScuRLocK, RETROAcTVE LEGISLATION AFFECTING IN-
TERESTS IN LAND 8-18 (1953).
20 OKLA. CONST. art. 2, §§ 7, 15.
21 Id. § 15.
2 Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548 (1913);
Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1933).
2 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1933).
24 Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Talbot, 112 Ind. 373, 14
N.E. 586 (1887).
25 Opinion of the Justices, 101 N.H. 515, 131 A.2d 49 (1952).
[Vol. 9, No. 1
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growing so long as to lose clarity and certainty,2 6 resort to
another device, such as marketable record title legislation,
ought to be similarly valid. The Oklahoma Act states its pur-
pose in terms that clearly come within the legitimate exer-
cise of the police power to promote public welfare:
This act shall be liberally construed to effect the
legislative purpose of simplifying and facilitating land
title transactions by allowing persons to rely on a rec-
ord chain of title as described in Section 1 of this act,
subject only to such limits as appear in Section 2 of
this act.27
The second test in determining whether the legislation is
a valid exercise of the state's police power involves the ques-
tion of whether the measures taken under the legislation are
reasonable and appropriate to the stated objectives. As far
as marketable record title legislation is concerned, the answer
to this question should be yes. The public good in terms of
more secure land transactions outweighs the burden and
risk imposed on owners of property interests which fall with-
in the operation of the legislation. Marketable record title
legislation is reasonable because it includes a period for ex-
isting property interests affected by it to be protected by re-
cordation. The 1963 version of the Oklahoma Act contained
a two year savings period for existing interests affected by
the Act.28 The 1970 Amendments to the Oklahoma Act also
contain a two year savings period for existing interests af-
fected by cutting the operational period of the Act from forty
years to thirty years.2 9 Marketable record title legislation is
reasonable because it provides ample time for individuals
whose property interests may be affected by the legislation
to protect their interests by notice recordation. The Oklahoma
Act provides that recording notice of an interest within thirty
20 See p. 69 supra.
27 OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, § 80 (1971).
28 Law of March 29, 1963, ch. 31, § 11, [1963] Okla. Laws 35
(repealed 1970).
29 Law of March 27, 1970, ch. 92, § 71, [1970] Okla. Laws 118.
1973]
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years of the recordation of the marketable record title claim-
ant's root of title will protect the interest from extinction. 0
Marketable record title legislation is reasonable because cer-
tain exceptions are made to preserve fairness in its operation.
There are specific interests that are excepted from operation
of the Oklahoma Act.31 Interests and defects which are in-
herent in the muniments of title forming the chain of record
title are not affected by the Oklahoma Act.32 And possession
can protect the interest of the possessor from extinction un-
der certain circumstances under the Oklahoma Act.3 3 And, fi-
nally, marketable record title legislation is reasonable because
it is comprehensive in its operation, applying to all interests
rather than singling out certain interests.
These constitutional attacks have been made against
marketable record title legislation in two jurisdictions and in
each case the legislation has been upheld as valid.34 Although
not having yet been passed on by the Oklahoma Supreme
Court, the constitutionality of the Oklahoma Act has been
upheld in a 1968 opinion of the Attorney General of Okla-
homa.33
INDIAN LANDS
Under the Congressional Enabling Act3 6 enabling the Ter-
ritory of Oklahoma and the Indian Territory to form a con-
stitution and a state government and be admitted to the Un-
ion, and under the Oklahoma Constitution,3 7 the State of Ok-
So OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, §§ 72(b), 74(a) (1971).
31 See p. 97 infra.
32 See p. 92 infra.
33 See p. 89 infra.
34 Tesdell v. Hanes, 248 Iowa 742, 82 N.W.2d 119 (1957); Lane
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 230 Iowa 973, 299 N.W. 553 (1941);
Wichelman v. Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 83 N.W.2d 800 (1957).
35 Okla. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 67-444 (March 21, 1968), 39 OKLA.
B. Ass'N J. 593 (1968).
36 Act of June 16, 1906, ch. 3335, 34 Stat. 267.
3T OKLA. CoNsT. art. 1, § 3.
[Vol. 9, No. I
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lahoma disclaimed all rights and title to lands owned or held
by any Indian, tribe, or nation, and affirmed the federal gov-
ernment's authority and jurisdiction over such lands. There-
fore, there is a stringent limitation placed on the jurisdiction
of the State of Oklahoma over Indian lands which casts doubt
on the applicability of its statutes, such as the Marketable Rec-
ord Title Act, to such lands. Oklahoma Title Examination
Standard 19.1, declaring the remedial effect of the Marketable
Record Title Act, recognizes this problem in a caveat, which
states:
Whether or not the provisions of the Marketable
Record Title Act may be relied upon to cure or remedy
such imperfections of title as fall within its scope,
which imperfections occurred or arose during the time
title to the land was in a tribe of Indians or held in
trust by the United States for a tribe of Indians or
a member or members thereof, or was restricted
against alienation by treaty or by act of Congress, is
a matter for determination by Congress or by a fed-
eral court in a case to which the United States is
properly made a party. Until such determination, the
Marketable Record Title Act should not be relied upon
to cure or remedy such imperfections .... However,
it is possible that the federal courts will consider
the Marketable Record Title Act to be a statute of
limitations within the meaning of the Act of April
12, 1926, with respect to the Five Civilized Tribes.
For a number of reasons, however, it is doubtful that the
Oklahoma Act can be construed to be a statute of limitations
within the meaning of the Act of April 12, 1926. One of the
draftsmen of the Model Act, upon which the Oklahoma Act
is based, has stated that marketable record title legislation
should not be considered as a statute of limitations.38 Under
a statute of limitations, one's cause of action is barred if he
fails to file suit on such cause of action within the period
prescribed; whereas, under marketable title legislation, one
38 L. SIMEs & C. TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 350; L. SrmEs, supra
note 3, at 43.
19731
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whose interest is extinguished by its terms may never have
had any cause of action, and the period prescribed may not
start from the accruing of any cause of action. Contrasted with
this approach is that of the Act of April 12, 1926, which speaks
of barring causes of action. For example, the clause provid-
ing for a grace period provides: "... . Provided, That no cause
of action which heretofore shall have accrued to any Indian
shall be barred prior to the expiration of a period of two
years from and after approval of this Act ... ."39 A mem-
ber of the Solicitor General's staff, when asked about the ap-
plicability of the Act of April 12, 1926, to the Oklahoma Mark-
etable Record Title Act, once stated that in his opinion the
Department of Interior would not permit the application of
the Oklahoma Act under the provisions of the Act of 1926,
and that the Department had a standing practice of resisting
this in other states which have a marketable record title act.
40
The Real Property Committee of the Oklahoma Bar As-
sociation passed a resolution in 1965 urging the Association
to urge Congress to pass legislation giving effect to the Okla-
homa Act in all cases involving restricted Indian lands. 41 But
Congress has taken no action on this matter up to the present
time.
The inability to utilize the Oklahoma Act's remedial pro-
visions when present or former Indian lands are involved is
reflected in Oklahoma Title Examination Standard 19.13, deal-
ing with abstracting. Section (f) of this Standard states the
following requirements for a sufficient abstract covering In-
dian lands:
Where title stems from a tribe of Indians or from
a patent where the United States holds title in trust
for an Indian the abstract shall contain all recorded
instruments from inception of title other than trea-
ties ....
39 Act of April 12, 1926, ch. 115, 44 Stat. 339, 340.
40 Pray, supra note 2, at 617.
41 36 OxLA. B. ASS'N J. 2094 (1965).
[Vol. 9, No. 1
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Exceptions to this requirement are made in situations where
there is an unallotted land deed or where a patent is to a freed-
man or intermarried white member of the Five Civilized
Tribes and where a patent is from the Osage Nation to an in-
dividual and there is of record a conveyance from the allottee
and a certificate of competency. Under these circumstances a
less inclusive abstract is sufficient.
TYPES OF INTERESTS PROTECTED BY THE
OKLAHOMA ACT
Section 71 of the Oklahoma Act states that the holder of
"any interest" who meets the requirements of the Act shall
be deemed to have marketable record title to "such interest."
Marketable record title acts in some jurisdictions42 have been
construed to be limited in application to a fee simple title.
But Oklahoma's Act, on its face, is not so limited. Therefore,
many interests, such as fees simple determinable, fees simple
on condition subsequent, and life estates, as well as fees sim-
ple absolute, are protected by the Oklahoma Act. Granted,
the Act will be applied to fees simple absolute in most cases
because they are most commonly created and because only
interests inconsistent with the protected interest are affected
by the Act;43 nevertheless, the approach taken in the Okla-
homa Act renders a greater number of titles marketable and
lessens the burden of title search and title examination for
interests less than fee simple.
42 See, e.g., Mnm. STAT. AN. § 541.023 (Supp. 1973). This
statute protects "a claim of title based upon a source of
title, which source has been of record at least forty years,"
which the Minnesota Supreme Court, in Wichelman v.
Messner, 250 Minn. 88, 83 N.W.2d 800 (1957), construed to
refer to a fee simple, including fees simple subject to other
interests, but not to the other interests.
48 Barnett, supra note 3, at 64.
1973]
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TYPES OF INTERESTS SUBJECT TO EXTINGUISHMENT
UNDER THE OKLAHOMA ACT
It is the extinguishment feature of the Oklahoma Act that
differentiates it from legislation such as statutes of limitation
and curative statutes. The Act is truly comprehensive in its
scope, applying to all types of interests not found within a
particular thirty-year chain of title.44 The Act can operate on
both present and future interests, vested and contingent in-
terests, possessory and non-possessory interests, and genuine
and technical interests. It is equally applicable to both legal
and equitable interests. It is applicable to the interest of per-
sons who are either sui juris or under a disability, who are
either within or without the state, who are either natural or
corporate, private or governmental. The only limitations to
the Act's applicability are found in Sections 72, 74 and 76,
which are discussed later.45
WHO MAY CLAIM A MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE
UNDER THE OKLAHOMA ACT
The comprehensiveness of the Oklahoma Act is also dem-
onstrated by the profile of a claimant under the Act. There
are both negative and positive characteristics that combine
to define what type of person may claim protection under the
Act. The negative characteristics differentiate the underlying
philosophy of the Act from other types of corrective legisla-
tion. To begin with, a claimant under the Act need not be a
bona fide purchaser; he can have knowledge of outstanding
interests extinguished by the Act.40 Since one of the objec-
tives of the Act is to simplify land title transactions by sim-
plifying title examination and since this can be done only by
eliminating to the extent possible all matters extrinsic to the
record, such extraneous factors as the bona fides of a particu-
44 OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, § 73 (1971).
45 See p. 93 infra.
46 Barnett, supra note 3, at 53, 64.
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lar individual are omitted as requirements. Indeed, the very
requirement of being a purchaser is omitted as a required
characteristic of a claimant under the Act; the Act's extin-
guishment feature benefits the interests of owners as well as
those of purchasers.47 Therefore, a conveyance or other title
transaction need not occur as a condition precedent to the
operation of the Act. Also, a claimant under the Act need not
have been in possession of the land involved at any time.48
Just as in the case of the bona fides of the claimant, the fact
of possession is extrinsic to the record and is omitted as a
requirement of a claimant under the Act in order to facilitate
the Act's objectives of simplifying land transactions by sim-
plifying title examination and comprehensively clearing land
titles. Since the Act affects title to vacant as well as occupied
land, its coverage is much more inclusive of all lands within
Oklahoma than would otherwise be the case. Finally, as was
noted earlier,49 one need not claim a fee simple title to enjoy
the benefits of the Act.
The affirmative characteristic which a claimant under the
Oklahoma Act must possess is provided for in Section 71,
which states that a marketable record title holder must have
an "unbroken chain of title of record" from the root of title
onward. Therefore, until all gaps in the post-root chain of
title are filled in by recorded instruments, the extinguishment
feature of the Act will not operate. For example: if one of
the gaps is caused by an owner's death intestate, the extin-
guishment feature will not operate until there has been some
type of judicial determination of heirship.
47 P. BASYE, supra note 3, at 425; Barnett, supra note 3, at 53.
48 Barnett, supra note 3, at 63-64. Some acts specifically re-
quire that the claimant be in possession to enjoy the bene-
fits of the Act. See, e.g., NEB. R.v. STAT. § 76-288 (1971);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-19A-01 (1960).
49 See p. 81 supra.
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WILD DEEDS AND QUITCLAIM DEEDS
AS ROOTS OF TITLE
Wild Deeds
It is rare that a person deliberately purports to sell the
land of another or that an owner deliberately attempts to sell
the same land twice. However, "wild deeds," those instruments
unconnected with the true chain of title, can arise in a num-
ber of fairly common situations. For example, when subdi-
vided land is sold by a common grantor, the descriptions in
the deeds to the various subdivided portions may overlap. In
another situation, a grantor may convey his land by warranty
deed to one person and by quitclaim deed to another. Also, a
mistaken land description in a deed can give rise to this prob-
lem.
Competing chains of title to the same land can be created
by entirely independent chains of record title. For example,
0, the true owner of Blackacre, conveys it to A in 1940 by a
duly recorded deed. In 1942 X, who has no connection with
Blackacre, purports to convey it by a "wild deed" to Y, whose
deed is duly recorded. There is no doubt that under either com-
mon law principles or a recording act Y takes nothing and A
has good title to Blackacre.50 But, under the Oklahoma Mark-
etable Record Title Act, in 1972 Y can claim that he has a
marketable record title to Blackacre which is free and clear
of any claim or interest on the part of A because A's interest
depends on a transaction that occurred prior to the effective
date of Y's root of title.51
Competing chains of title can also arise from a common
source. For example, 0, the true owner of Blackacre, conveys
it to A in 1940 by a duly recorded deed, and then in 1942 pur-
ports to convey Blackacre again to Y by a duly recorded deed.
Once again there is no doubt that under either common law
50 Barnett, supra note 3, at 57.
51 Id.
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principles or a recording act Y takes nothing and A has good
title to Blackacre.52 However, under the Oklahoma Act, in
1972 Y can assert that he has a marketable record title to
Blackacre which is free and clear of any claim or interest on
the part of A because A's interest depends on a transaction
that occurred prior to the effective date of Y's root of title.53
In either of the above examples, will Y be able to suc-
cessfully assert the Oklahoma Act as a basis for holding title
free and clear of any claim or interest in A? Such a result
would evidence a remarkable departure from the rules ap-
plied to such situations by either the common law or the re-
cording acts. The only two jurisdictions having dealt with
this problem have reached opposite conclusions. In Florida,
by virtue of the decision in Marshall v. Hollywood,14 a wild
deed can serve as a root of title which may ultimately ex-
guish the true title. In this case, the plaintiff sought a decree
establishing his interest in certain lands to which he held a
claimed legal title but which had been conveyed away in 1924
by a deed claimed to be a forgery and which, by succeeding
conveyances in 1924 and 1931, had come into the hands of
the defendants. The defendants claimed that the Florida Mark-
etable Record Title Act applied in this situation to extinguish
the title of the plaintiff because the plaintiff's interest depend-
ed on a transaction that occurred prior to the effective date
of the defendants' root of title. The Florida intermediate ap-
pellate court upheld this defense on the basis that the Florida
Act defines "root of title" as a title transaction which purports
to create or transfer an estate; therefore, the Act's applica-
bility is not conditioned on an active vesting of some estate
or interest in the person claiming the benefit of the Act. The
court held that only by interpreting the Act in this way could
the Act's purpose of facilitating land transactions by allow-
152 Id. at 54-55.
63 Id.
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ing persons interested therein to rely on a record title be
achieved. The court reasoned that adequate protection is given
to the true owner under the Act because the extinguishment
of the true title by a "wild" chain of title would not occur
so long as the true title is still "live" in the sense that: (1)
there is a title transaction within the true chain of title with-
in thirty years subsequent to the root of title forming the
foundation of the wild chain of title;55 (2) there has been a
filing of notice under the terms of the Act by the true title
holder within the time allowed;50 or (3) the true owner has
remained in possession under the provisions of the Act relating
to possession.57 The court concluded that although the original
1924 forged deed in the defendants' chain of title could not
serve as root of title, 8 the later 1924 deed and the 1931 deed,
although each was void, could serve as root of title.
On the other hand, the Illinois Supreme Court, in Ex-
change National Bank v. Lawndale National Bank,59 held that
a wild deed cannot serve as root of title that will ultimately
extinguish the interest of the true title holder. In this case
the plaintiff claimed title by a chain of title that commenced
with a patent from the United States in 1899. The defendant
claimed title from a different chain that commenced subse-
quent to that of the plaintiff. Although the plaintiff and de-
fendant did not have a common source of title and it was
admitted that the defendant's chain of title was founded up-
on a wild deed, the defendant claimed title by virtue of the
Illinois Marketable Record Title Act60 because neither the
plaintiff nor its predecessors in title had kept their claim alive
by filing a preserving statement of claim within forty years
after the defendant's interest was created. The court held that
the Illinois Act was inapplicable to this situation, partly on
55 See p. 96 infra.51 See p. 94 infra.
5T See p. 89 infra.
58 See p. 93 infra.
59 41 Ill. 2d 316, 243 N.E.2d 193 (1968).
0 ILL. Am. STAT. ch. 83, §§ 12.1-.4 (Smith-Hurd 1966).
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the basis that it would be impossible for the true title holder
to determine the existence of a chain of title based on a wild
deed in the grantor-grantee index system and protect his in-
terest by taking the appropriate steps required by the Illinois
Act. Note that if a state provides for a tract indexing system,
as Oklahoma does,61 the basis for the Illinois decision is re-
moved because a chain of title based on a wild deed would
be as discoverable as one within the true chain of title.
QuitcZaim Deeds
Quitclaim deeds present a problem as to their ability to
serve as a root of title because of their characteristic of con-
veying no particular interest of the grantor, but only what-
ever interest the grantor actually has. The co-author of the
Model Act, upon which the Oklahoma Act is based, has stated
that a quitclaim deed in a chain of title has the same effect
as any other link in the chain; therefore, it can serve as root
of title so as to bring into operation the Act.6 The Oklahoma
Act bears out this view by defining "title transaction" (which
serves as root of title under the Act) to include a quitclaim
deed.3 Oklahoma Title Examination Standard 19.10 express-
ly provides that a recorded quitclaim deed can be a root of
title or a link in the chain of title for purposes of a thirty-
year record title under the Oklahoma Act.
Oklahoma has a statutory form for the quitclaim deed 64
which, when used, conveys all the right, title and interest of
the grantor in and to the premises described in the deed.65
This provision is a statutory reiteration of the common law
rule that a quit claim deed conveys only such interest as the
grantor may have. The similarity of the statutory form of
quitclaim deed to the common law form is seen in the fact
that in both types of quitclaim deeds the estoppel by deed
81 OKLA. STAT. tit. 19, § 291 (1971).
62 Simes, supra note 2, at 2362.
6 OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, § 78 (f) (1971).
64 Id. § 41.
Or Id. § 18.
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rule is not applicable to convey a title subsequently acquired
by the grantor to the grantee.6 6 Therefore, it would seem that
the Oklahoma Act would apply to either type of quitclaim
deed in the same way.
The only state having a marketable record title act which
has considered this question is Florida. In Wilson v. Kelley67
the plaintiff in a quiet title suit claimed title under what
was proved to be the original and paramount source. The de-
fendant claimed title under a chain of title originating sub-
sequent to that of the plaintiff which had a quitclaim deed
as its source. The defendant claimed that the quitclaim deed
served as root of title under the Florida Act so that ultimately
the plaintiff's interest was extinguished by the operation of
the Act. The court held that a quitclaim deed may or may
not serve as root of title, depending on what it purports to
convey. If it does not purport to convey any particular in-
terest, but only whatever interest the grantor may own, it
cannot serve as root of title; however, if the quitclaim deed
evidences an intent to convey an identifiable interest, it can
serve as root of title. In the present case the court held that
the quitclaim deed fell into the former category and, there-
fore, could not serve as root of title. It has been observed
that this approach is primarily an exercise in semantics be-
cause a true quitclaim deed does not purport to create any
specific interest in property and a deed which does purport
to create a specific interest should not be labeled a quitclaim
deed.68
However, Section 78(e) of the Oklahoma Act agrees with
the distinction drawn in Wilson by stating that a root of title
66 As to the common law quitclaim deed, see 4 H. TIFFANY,
THE LAW OF REAL PRoPERTY § 1231, at 645 (3d ed. B. Jones
1939).
67 226 So. 2d 123 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
68 See Comment, Marketable Record Title Act: Wild, Forged,
and Void Deeds as Roots of Title, 22 FLA. L. REv. 669, 671
(1970).
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must purport to create the interest claimed by the claimant.
There is an apparent inconsistency, then, between Section
78 (f) of the Oklahoma Act which includes quitclaim deeds
in the definition of "title transaction" and Section 78 (e) which
states that a root of title must purport to create the interest
claimed by the claimant under the Act. Only if a quitclaim
deed, whether statutory or otherwise, purports to convey an
identifiable interest by the grantor can it satisfy both of these
sections of the Oklahoma Act.
THE RELEVANCE OF POSSESSION
Since possession is a fact extrinsic to the record and since
one of the objectives of marketable record title legislation is
to facilitate land title transactions by allowing persons to rely
on a record chain of title, the relevance of possession is mini-
mized under this legislation. However, considerations of basic
fairness compelled the authors of the Model Act to make pos-
session relevant to the status of the title to the land possess-
ed in two situations. The Oklahoma Act follows the Model
Act in this respect.
The first situation in which possession is relevant is cov-
ered in Section 74(b) of the Oklahoma Act. This section pro-
vides:
If the same record owner of any possessory in-
terest in land has been in possession of such land con-
tinuously for a period of thirty years or more, during
which period no title transaction with respect to such
interest appears of record in his chain of title, and no
notice has been filed by him or on his behalf as pro-
vided in subsection (a), and such possession continues
to the time when marketability is being determined,
such period of possession shall be deemed equivalent
to the filing of the notice immediately preceding the
termination of the thirty-year period described in sub-
section (a).
The following example illustrates the meaning of this section.
A is the last grantee in a chain of record title to Blackacre by
a deed recorded in 1940. There are no subsequent instruments
1973]
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of record in this chain of title. A has been in possession of
Blackacre since 1940 and continues in possession, but has never
filed any notice as provided for in Section 74 (a) of the Ok-
lahoma Act. A deed to Blackacre, unconnected with A's chain
of title, from X to Y, was recorded in 1942. If no other instru-
ments with respect to Blackacre appear of record, Y has a
marketable record title in 1972, but, by the terms of Section
74(b), it is subject to A's marketable record title. However,
although A had a marketable record title to Blackacre in 1971,
it was subject to Y's marketable record title in 1972 according
to Section 72 (d). Thus, the relative rights of A and Y are de-
termined independently of the Act since the interest of each
is subject to the other's interest. A's interest being prior in
time and Y's deed being merely a wild deed, under common
law principles A should prevail.
It should be emphasized, however, that this type of pos-
session saves the possessor's title from extinguishment only
in very limited circumstances. The following elements must
be present in the situation for this type of possession to be
effective in protecting the possessor's interest from extinguish-
ment: (1) the possessor must be a record owner, i.e., the pos-
sessor must be connected with a recorded instrument which
goes back at least thirty years; (2) possession must begin be-
fore the recording of the root of title of the person claim-
ing a marketable record title under the Act and must continue
to the time marketability is being determined; and (3) pos-
session must be continuous by the "same record owner," i.e.,
no "tacking" of possession is allowed.
The second situation in which possession is relevant is
dealt with in Section 72(c) of the Oklahoma Act, which pro-
vides that a marketable record title is subject to the rights
of any person arising from a period of adverse possession or
user, which is in whole or in part subsequent to the effective
date of the root of title. The following example illustrates the
meaning of this section. A is the grantee of Blackacre in a
deed which was recorded in 1956. In 1957 X entered into pos-
session, claiming adversely to all the world, and continued
[Vol. 9, No. 1
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such adverse possession until the present time. No other in-
struments concerning Blackacre appearing of record, in 1971
A had a marketable record title, but it was subject to X's ad-
verse possession, and when X's period for title by adverse pos-
session was completed in 1972, A's title was subject to X's
title by adverse possession.
One interesting question that arises in connection with
Section 72(c) of the Oklahoma Act is whether this section
can benefit both the true adverse possessor and the true own-
er under a senior chain of title. For example, in the illustra-
tions given earlier,62 dealing with wild deeds, could A's pos-
session of Blackacre in each instance be considered "adverse
possession" under Section 72(c) so as to protect his interest
against the claims of Y? One authority"0 suggests that a true
title holder under a senior chain of title can claim the benefit
of this section and there are authorities holding that the hold-
er of the true title can perfect it against a holder of an ap-
parent title.7'1 On the other hand, it can be argued that before
any possession is deemed to be "adverse" for purposes of Sec-
tion 72(c) there must be a cause of action arising in favor of
someone against the possessor; whereas, no cause of action
arises against the true title holder under a senior chain of
title. In addition, such an interpretation conflicts with Section
74(b) of the Oklahoma Act which specifies the only way pos-
session can aid the true title holder.
Although adverse possession wholly or partly subsequent
to the effective date of a claimant's root of title is relevant
under the Oklahoma Act, a title by adverse possession that
matures before the effective date of a claimant's root of title
is extinguished thirty years after that date. The following
example illustrates this situation. A is the grantee of Black-
acre in a deed which was recorded in 1925. In that same year
69 See pp. 84-85 supra.
70 Barnett, supra note 3, at 61.
71 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 21 (1972).
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X entered into possession, claiming adversely to all the world,
and continued in such adverse possession until 1941. In 1942
a deed conveying Blackacre from A to B was recorded. No
other instruments concerning the land appearing of record,
B has a marketable record title to Blackacre in 1972 which
extinguishes X's title by adverse possession acquired in 1940.
In conjunction with this discussion of the relevance of
possession, it should be noted that some marketable record
title acts require that persons claiming a marketable record
title be in possession in order to obtain the extinguishment
benefit of the Act.72 But the Oklahoma Act does not require
this; therefore, in Oklahoma the interest of a senior grantee
out of possession can be extinguished by a junior grantee al-
so out of possession. The Oklahoma Act has wide coverage
because it is applicable to vacant as well as to occupied land.
INTERESTS EXCEPTED FROM EXTINGUISHMENT
Although marketable record title legislation is unique in
its comprehensiveness in affecting stale interests and defects
in a chain of title, because one of its objectives is to affect
stale, as opposed to viable, claims, there are exceptions to its
coverage. The exceptions are important not only because of
the interests involved which are not affected by the legisla-
tion, but also because of the impact the exceptions have on
one of the other objectives of the legislation- the simplifica-
tion of land title transactions by reducing the period of title
search and the period of title examination. To the extent that
any exceptions are recognized, the simplification of title in-
vestigation is prevented to some extent. However, some ex-
ceptions to the operation of marketable record title legisla-
tion are desirable from the standpoint of basic fairness and
from the standpoint of the constitutionality of the legisla-
72 See Rohde, Illinois Marketable Title Act, 39 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 49, 60 (1962).
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tion.73 The exceptions contained in the Oklahoma Act are lo-
cated in Sections 72, 74 and 76.
Section 72(a) excepts from extinguishment all interests
and defects which are inherent in the muniments which form
the chain of record title creating the marketable record title.
Thus, all interests and defects inherent in the root of title
and in all subsequent links in the chain of title are not af-
fected by the Act. Identical language in the Florida Act has
been construed to refer to interests and defects in the make-
up or constitution of the muniment of title and not to defects
or failures in the transmission of title.7 4 For example, if the
root of title is a forged deed, the Act will not cut off the in-
terest of the purported grantor even though his interest is
based on a pre-root transaction. Also, the Act does not elimi-
nate problems of forgeries in any link subsequent to the root
of title, or problems of post-root deeds ineffective for lack of
delivery or because of the grantor's incapacity to convey. How-
ever, this section does not apply to wild deeds"5 involving de-
fects or failures in the transmission of title. This distinction
must rank as one of the most anomalous aspects of the Okla-
homa Act.
This Section also excepts from extinguishment those pre-
root-of-title interests which are specifically identified in any
of the muniments forming the chain of record title creating
the marketable record title. However, a general reference to
such interests is ineffective; the Act requires "specific identi-
fication." Comment 3 to Oklahoma Title Examination Stand-
ard 19.13 states that the book and page of the recording of
a prior mortgage is required to be in the post-root muniment
in order to give notice of such prior mortgage,76 while "spe-
cific identification" of other instruments requires either the
78 See p. 75 supra.
74 Marshall v. Hollywood, 224 So. 2d 743 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1969), affd, 236 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 1970).
76 See p. 84 supra.
71 OKLA. STAT. tit. 46, § 203 (1971).
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book and page of recording or such other information as will
enable an abstracter to locate the instrument of record.
Sections 72(b) and 74(a) refer to the same exception in-
volving the preserving of any interest by filing for record
during the thirty year period immediately following the ef-
fective date of the root of title of the person whose record title
would otherwise be marketable, a notice setting forth the
nature of the claim. These sections insure that no interest
will of necessity be extinguished under the Act because the
holder of a viable interest is given the opportunity to pre-
serve his interest. In these sections the Act's objective of
cleansing a title of stale claims is clearly seen because, in the
ordinary course of events, it will be stale claims, not viable
ones, which are no longer of any beneficial or practical im-
portance, but which still cloud title, which are extinguished
because of a failure of their holders to file the required notice.
The notice, to be effective, must be in writing, 7 verified
by oath, 8 and contain an accurate and full description of all
land affected. 9 No disability or lack of knowledge whatever
on the part of anyone will toll the running of the thirty-year
period. However, the notice may be filed not only by the en-
cumbrancer himself, but also by any other person acting for
an encumbrancer who is under a disability, or unable to as-
sert his claim, or one of a class whose identity is uncertain.
These provisions effectively remove the possibility of extend-
ing the basic thirty-year period by a tolling provision, while
at the same time removing much of the harsh effect on an
encumbrancer arising therefrom by providing that encum-
brancers unable to file a preserving notice can be protected
by a filing in their behalf by interested third persons.
Within what period of time must the notice be filed to
be effective? Because of the way in which the Act operates,
7 OKLA. STAT. tit. 16, § 74(a) (1971).
78 Id.
79 Id. tit. 16, § 75.
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there are two relevant time points- the starting point and
the ending point of the period. If the notice is not filed with-
in these two points it will be ineffective to preserve the in-
terest of the encumbrancer. The starting point is the date of
recording of the root of title. Any notice recorded prior to
that time is ineffective to preserve any interest. This is the
case because the basic effect of the Act, as expressed in Sec-
tion 73, is to extinguish all interests and claims, including
those preserved by the filing of notice, the existence of which
depends upon any act that occurred prior to the effective date
of the root of title. The ending point is the date thirty years
from the effective date (date of recording) of the root of
title. This is so because the Act is quieting the marketable
record title claimant's thirty-year chain of title because there
are no notices filed during this period.80 Thus, an encumbranc-
er has thirty years and only thirty years from the date of the
recording of the root of title in which to record his notice. A
recording of notice after this point is ineffective to preserve
the interest of the encumbrancer. Section 74(a) specifically
provides for this by requiring that a notice to be effective
must be filed for record "during the thirty-year period im-
mediately following the effective date of the root of title of
the person whose record title would otherwise be marketable."
In two situations the interests of possessors of the land
in controversy are protected from extinguishment. Section
74(b) provides that continuous possession by the same record
owner for a period of thirty years or more following the re-
cording of the root of title and to the time marketability is
being determined is deemed equivalent to the filing of notice
immediately preceding the termination of the thirty-year pe-
riod following the recording of the root of title. Such posses-
sion, then, will protect the possessor's interest against extin-
guishment by the Act. Also, Section 72(c) provides that a
marketable record title is subject to the rights of any person
arising from a period of adverse possession or user which is
80 L. SInmS & C. TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 354-55.
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in whole or in part subsequent to the effective date of the
root of title. Since these two sections have been discussed
earlier in the article,81 further discussion of them is omitted
here.
Section 72(d) excepts from extinguishment any interest
relating to a title transaction which has been recorded sub-
sequent to the effective date of the root of title from which
an unbroken chain of record title is started. Oklahoma Title
Examination Standard 19.9, which considers this provision of
the Act, states that it provides, in effect, that the recording
of a title transaction subsequent to the effective date of the
root of title has the same effect in preserving any interest
conveyed as the filing of the notice provided for in Section
74 (a) of the Act. Thus, to the extent that a title is "live," i.e.,
subject to periodic transactions,82 the interests transferred will
be protected from extinguishment.
Section 72(d) is applicable both where there are claims
under a single chain of title and where there are claims aris-
ing from two or more independent chains of title. The more
common situation involves claims arising under a single chain
of title. For example, suppose 0, owner of Blackacre in fee
simple, executed a mortgage to X in 1940, which was duly
recorded. In 1942 0 conveyed the fee simple title to A by a
duly recorded instrument which made no reference to X's
mortgage. In 1960 an instrument assigning X's mortgage to
Y was recorded. In 1973 A has a title subject to the mortgage
held by Y, because the assignment of the mortgage was re-
corded less than thirty years after the effective date of A's
root of title. The more unusual situation, involving claims
arising from independent chains of title, the so-called "wild
deed" situation,8 is also-covered by this Section. Suppose 0,
owner of Blackacre in fee simple, conveyed to A in fee simple
in 1930, the deed being duly recorded. Then, in 1935 X, a
81 See p. 89 supra.
82 See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
83 See p. 84 supra.
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stranger to the title, conveyed Blackacre to Y in fee simple,
the deed being duly recorded. In 1942 Y conveyed Blackacre
to Z in fee simple and the deed was duly recorded. In 1960
A conveyed Blackacre to B in fee simple, the deed being duly
recorded. In 1973 Z and B each have marketable record titles,
but each title is subject to the other by virtue of Section 72 (d).
Therefore, neither extinguishes the other and the relative
rights of the parties are determined independently of the Act.
Z's deed being merely a wild deed, under common law prin-
ciples B's title should prevail. Notice that the 1960 transaction
prevented B's title from being extinguished by Z's thirty-year
chain of title commencing with the 1942 root-deed.
However, under Section 72 (d), once an interest has been
extinguished prior to such a recording as is described in this
section, such recording does not revive or give validity to the
interest. For example, in the first example given in the im-
mediately preceding paragraph, if X's assignment of the mort-
gage to Y was executed and recorded in 1973 rather than in
1960, its recordation would not revive the security interest
extinguished in 1972 by A's marketable record title. Likewise,
in the second example given in the immediately preceding
paragraph, if A's deed to B was executed and recorded in 1973
rather than in 1960, its recordation would not revive the in-
terest extinguished in 1972 by Z's marketable record title.
Certain pre-root-of-title interests are excepted from the
operation of the Act by virtue of Sections 72(e) and 76. These
sections list particular types of interests concerning which no
notice of claim need be recorded. There are five such inter-
ests listed in the Oklahoma Act: (1) the interest of a lessor
as a reversioner on the expiration of a lease; (2) mineral or
royalty interests severed from the fee simple title of the land;
(3) easements or interests in the nature of easements; (4) use
restrictions or area agreements which are part of a plan for
subdivision development; and (5) any interest of the United
States. These exceptions force title examination behind the
root of title and, thus, thwart to some extent one of the basic
objectives of the Act -to simplify land title transactions by
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reducing the period of title search and the period of title ex-
amination. Oklahoma Title Examination Standard 19.11 points
this out by stating that the Act has not eliminated the ne-
cessity of furnishing an abstract of title for a period exceed-
ing thirty years. In addition, these exceptions tend to thwart
another of the basic objectives of the Act-to comprehensively
clear land titles. Nevertheless, every marketable record title
act now in effect has similar exceptions. Let us examine the
reasons why.
The Oklahoma Act follows the Model Act in excepting
from extinguishment the reversionary interest of a lessor fol-
lowing a lease.84 The reason given for this exception in the
Model Act is that leases of very long duration are common in
some jurisdictions, and the lessor who is out of possession
might reasonably overlook the requirement of notice filing.85
This argument could be applied as validly to other types of
future interests, such as reversions following life estates, re-
mainders, possibilities of reverter and powers of termination;
yet, none of these interests are excepted. Here can be seen a
distinction, drawn between commercial interests, which long-
term leases usually are, and non-commercial interests that is
present in many of the other exceptions as well.
The Oklahoma Act excepts severed mineral and royalty
interests from the operation of the Act. This exception is not
included in the Model Act. In fact, the draftsmen of the Model
Act believed that, rather than being unique, mineral interests
have a great deal in common with other specific long-term
interests in land insofar as the conveyancing system is con-
cerned; therefore, they should be subjected to a re-recording
requirement as other interests are.86 In the only direct refer-
ence to the marketable record title legislation pending in the
Oklahoma Legislature at the time, the draftsmen of the Model
Act observed: "Its application to mineral interests is consid-
81 L. Snzs & C. TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 9.
85 Id. at 357.
86 Id. at 239-47.
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ered one of the most desirable features of a 30-year market-
able title act pending in the Oklahoma Legislature."8 7 The
fact that the legislation, as enacted, contains an exception for
severed mineral and royalty interests speaks eloquently of the
position of the oil and gas industry in Oklahoma.
The Oklahoma Act excepts all easements or interests in
the nature of easements from the operation of the Act. Most
other marketable record title acts are more limited. The Model
Act, for example, excepts only easements clearly observable
by physical evidence of their use.88 This exception can be ex-
plained on the basis that most easements today are held by
one who holds a great number of similar easements, such as a
unit of government or a public utility, and to require periodic
re-recording of such easements would place too great a burden
on the easement holder and would flood the county clerk's of-
fice with recordings. This observation points out one of the
basic characteristics of all marketable record title legislation:
it is designed and intended to apply to private and singular
interests and defects and not to wide-ranging, multiple in-
terests.
This characteristic is seen even more clearly in the ex-
ception in the Oklahoma Act relating to use restrictions and
area agreements which are part of a plan for subdivision de-
velopment. These are types of negative easements or servi-
tudes which are different from the easements mentioned above
because they are held by private individuals or associations
but which are similar in that they likewise create multiple
interests which marketable record title legislation is not de-
signed to cope with. If an equitable servitude is part of a
subdivision development plan and is one of the large number
of reciprocal servitudes binding all tracts within the subdivi-
sion, applying the notice filing requirement of the Act to such
a servitude would be impractical, burdensome and expensive.
To keep the subdivision plan alive each owner would need
87 Id. at 246-47 n. 32.
88 Id. at 9.
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to record a claim under the Act against every other lot own-
er periodically. It is obvious why this would ordinarily not
be done, because of the time and expense involved in de-
termining who all the other lot owners are and because of
the expense entailed in such multiple filings. But if less than
all lot owners filed their claims against all others, some servi-
tudes would be extinguished under the Act and the doctrine
of changed character of the neighborhood could apply to end
all of the restrictions.8 9 The draftsmen of the Model Act an-
ticipated this problem and recommended, as one solution, ex-
cepting from the operation of the Act all equitable servitudes
which are a part of a plan for subdivision development.00
This is the solution that the Oklahoma Legislature placed in
the Oklahoma Act.
The last exception found in Sections 72(e) and 76 of the
Oklahoma Act relates to any interest of the United States.
Because of the inability of the State of Oklahoma to affect
an interest of the federal government, this exception would
exist whether included in the Act or not.91 Some acts in other
jurisdictions exclude any interest of the state from the opera-
tion of the act;92 however, the Oklahoma Act does not exclude
any interest of the State of Oklahoma from the operation of
the Act.
CONCLUSION
One of the more exhaustive articles written on market-
able record title legislation in general is entitled, "Marketable
Title Acts-Panacea or Pandemonium?"93 As is true with
89 Id. at 224-27; see 2 Ab cAN LAW OF PRoPERTY § 9.39 (A.
J. Casner ed. 1952).
00 L. SnvaEs & C. TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 227-28.
91 Id. at 15.
92 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. Am. § 712.04 (1969); MICH. Comp. LAWS
AxN. § 565.104 (1967); N.D. CE=T. CODE § 47-19A-11 (1960).
93 53 CoxN= L.Q. 45 (1967).
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most legislation, the effect of the Oklahoma Act falls some-
where between these two extremes. The limitations and ex-
ceptions contained in the Act prevent it from being a true
panacea for the problems contained in the conveyancing proc-
ess. And experience thus far in Oklahoma, as well as in other
jurisdictions having marketable record title legislation, belies
any dire predictions of pandemonium raging through the con-
veyancing process as a result of the passage of this type of
legislation. On balance, the true value of the Oklahoma Act
can best be expressed in the following terms which were used
to assess the value of the Michigan Act, which served as the
indirect model for Oklahoma's Act:
. .. we may say that while the act did not, of itself,
cut off many interests that would otherwise have re-
mained valid and outstanding, it did afford naturally
timid title examiners, and also those other attorneys
who, for various reasons, felt themselves obligated to
anticipate the objections of the timid practitioner, a
new rationale for overlooking matters better left un-
raised. It also provides attorneys with additional legal
ammunition when they are confronted with insub-
stantial exceptions to a title.94
04 Jossman, The Forty Year Marketable Record Title Act: A
Reappraisal, 37 U. DET. L.J. 422, 424 (1960).
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